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	ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN NAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT C 3 December 1980		
MEMORANDUM			
Iranian	Capability to Expand th	ne War	25X1
	Summary		
targets in any country of Iran has an excellent chattack because the Gulf defenses, and the target	ficient capability to attack to the Persian Gulf. Despite hance to inflict considerable states have relatively weak ts are highly vulnerable. Ir ated some proficiency in cond	its war losses, damage in such an air and naval anian air and naval	
F01007/1007		·	25 X 1
Iranian Air Power			
Iran is most lifuture attack on the	ikely to use its fighter e Arabian Peninsula.	-bombers in any	
Abbas, are potential	airbases on the Gulf, Bo e within 30 minutes' fly: targets; both bases are war-related missions.	ing time of most	
Additional as Tehran capability	aircraft could stage fro , using Iran's impressive Y·	om as far away e airborne refueling	
aircraft a ducted by	bly still has nearly 100 available; successful at as few as two aircraft air-to-surface missiles.	tack could be con-	
This memorandum was prepared by Southwest Asia Analytic Center, Near East South Asia Division, Office of Political Analysis and		25X1	
Office of the State Department. Officer for Near East a	Strategic Research, in responsible It was coordinated with the Industrian Country Asia. Information consecutions and comments	onse to a request from National Intelligence available as of	25 X 1
Chief, Southwest Asia A		V	25 X 1
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Past bombing missions against Iraq demonstrate that Iran has some capable pilots; accuracy of the strikes is likely to be increased where enemy air defenses are weak. Gulf Air Defenses	25X1
The air defense capabilities of the other Gulf states are	
poor.	25X1

Iranian Naval Threat

Iran's Navy, despite serious equipment problems, could attack ships or offshore oil facilities.

- -- Most of the antiship missiles mounted on Iran's three destroyers and four frigates probably are not operational, but all seven ships have 115- or 127-millimeter guns that could inflict considerable damage employing the appropriate type of incendiary or armor-piercing rounds.
- -- Iran has only enough Harpoon missiles to arm fully two of its La Combattante fast patrol boats.

 Nevertheless, even one or two of the patrol boats, whose missiles have a range of more than 50 kilometers, could inflict serious damage.

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	25 X 1
Iran could also use its elite force of naval commandos as it has twice in the past month to all but destroy Iraqi offshore loading terminals near Al Faw. Commandos could be transported by Iran's fleet of 14 Hovercraft, and such an operation would be almost impossible to detect soon enough to counter.	25 X 1
Gulf Vulnerabilities to Naval Attack	
As in the case of airstrikes, Arabian Peninsula countries could offer little opposition.	
The Saudis have three torpedo-armed patrol boats but apparently no operational system to detect enemy warships.	
Oman has two missile-armed patrol boats operating regularly near the Strait of Hormuz. They could disrupt an assault against Oman or the UAE, but are too far south to help protect other countries	
on the Gulf.	25 X 1

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